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## Primitivism and relative fundamentality

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### ABSTRACT

In her *Making Things Up*, amongst the many other achievements of the volume, Bennett develops a rich account of relative fundamentality. She also defends a kind of deflationism about the notion: relative fundamentality is nothing over and above patterns of building. In this essay, I argue that the best and common competitor of this view – primitivism about relative fundamentality – is in worse shape than Bennett's evaluation would indicate. Deflationism looks to be the best view.

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Contemporary tales of the structure of the world usually begin with an author pointing to examples of what depends upon what: sets depend upon their members, chairs depend upon their parts, and so on. More often than not, such tales quickly segue to mention of the thought that there is also something fundamental. But our inroad to the idea that reality has a distinctive, overarching metaphysical structure is generally

