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Taking causing out of Bennett's *Making Things Up*

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ABSTRACT

In *Making Things Up*, Bennett defends the intriguing idea that causation should be included among the building (grounding) relations. I critique Bennett's arguments for inclusion, and claim that inclusion distorts her own treatments of causation, relative fundamentality, and absolute fundamentality. Instead, I argue for treating causation and grounding as separate species of generative, explanatory difference-making.

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Properly understood, then, the claim that causation is a building relation ought not be all that surprising or controversial. It is just the claim that there is a resemblance class containing both causation and vertical building as members. And that seems more or less obvious: of course there is a *broad* class of asymmetric irreflexive generative-talk-licensing necessitation relations that includes both causation and (putatively) noncausal determination relations like grounding or composition (Bennett 2017, 69).

