Note: the link is to a draft of just the first half. Also, it's worth noting that section 2 of my "The Determination-First Approach to Plexology" is a natural companion to this.
Recent publications and work in progress
In which I re-terrace the landscape concerning grounding and fundamentality. I do this in order to untangle questions that have been confused, and to clarify the extent to which certain seemingly opposing views share common assumptions. I also do it in order to reveal some hidden dry places–i.e., some hitherto unnoticed ways to handle the relevant phenomena without positing novel primitives. I sketch one such deflationist account, and pave the way for others.
My response to Jessica Wilson's target article, "The Fundamentality First Approach to Metaphysical Structure". I introduce the term 'plexic' and its cognates to refer to the cluster of notions having to do with dependence, determination, fundamentality, and whatnot. I then introduce the term 'robust plexic realism' for the view that there is at least one fundamental plexic property or relation (or, I suppose, other kind of entity). I point out that Wilson is just as much a robust plexic realist as Schaffer/Rosen-style "groundhogs", and that the dispute between them is a matter of disagreement about which plexic notion is most fundamental. I gesture towards a number of possible views on this front, and sketch a generic version of the most popular version: the Determination First Approach to plexology (DFA). It contrasts with a generic version of the Fundamentality First Approach, of which Wilson's particular view is an instance. Both generic views can be fleshed out in a number of ways, including ways that are not robustly realist.
Wilson argues that her Fundamentality First Approach is to be preferred because it is more ecumenical. I agree with her that ecumenicality is/can be a theoretical virtue, and further defend the point on her behalf. But I argue that 1) the DFA can be almost as ecumenical as Wilson wants the FFA to be, and 2) the FFA does not, and seemingly cannot, account for relative fundamentality relations among nonfundamentalia in any way other than positing another primitive. So the FFA costs far more and brings only the tiniest bit extra.
Note: the link is to the published paper, which references a longer version. That longer version is available here. Please be aware, though, that the short version actually contains additional material that isn't in the longer version! (Editing is magical that way.) Here are things I do in the long version that I reference in the shorter version:
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spell out some alternate versions of the DFA, notably a Wilsonian one that allows symmetric determination, reflexive determination, and determined fundamentals
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criticize Wilson's attempt to establish the possibility of "priority-flipping"
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criticize Wilson's half-hearted attempt to reduce relative fundamentality relations among nonfundamental things to certain non-directed relations plus a specification of what is fundamental
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indeed, I argue that Wilson is committed to primitive priority as well as absolute fundamentality, which means that she loses the cost-benefit tally.
Going underground | in progress – new draft posted soon
A paper about the role of general connecting principles (think bridge laws) in grounding. Quick version: such connecting principles can and sometimes do figure in grounds. Not always, not never. Sometimes. Along the way I...
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defend my 2011, 2017 view about what grounds the grounding facts from an influential objection by Shamik Dasgupta
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discuss the role of separatism and unionism on these questions
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dismiss Berker's claim that such principles could at best be redundant grounds (see also "Laws as partial grounds" below)
Laws as partial grounds (with Audrey Powers and Itamar Weinstock Saadon) | in progress
Selim Berker has argued that moral principles connecting the natural to the moral may express grounding claims, but cannot themselves be among the grounds of moral facts. We argue that this is wrong. Moral principles perfectly well can serve as partial grounds of moral facts, without redundancy or circularity. (This paper is connected to the project of "Going Underground.")
A puzzle about precommitment | in progress and unlikely to be shareable for a while
I am working out some ideas about the rational and moral permissibility of certain strategies for self-binding.
Kinds and groups | In progress – draft posted soon
What are kinds? Not what are natural kinds, but what are kinds, of which natural kinds are themselves a kind? After all, we are perfectly happy to talk about what kind of restaurants or movies we like. I lay out eleven desiderata on a theory of kindhood, and then point out that most of these are also desiderata on a theory of social groups. I argue that social groups are in fact kinds. (I have worked on this paper on and off for a while, but not recently.)
In defense of metaground | very short Analysis-style piece | in progress
In 2011, I asked the question, "what grounds the grounding facts?" And thus was an industry born. Yet there is something undeniably irritating about the question, and some people have suggested that it is problematic. Indeed, some have suggested that its existence is a reason to reject grounding. This is wrong. The metaground question is no more or less problematic than the question of how causation works.